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Clinical genetics in practice
The whole truth and nothing but the truth, but
what is the truth?
Hanneke M A van den Boer-van den Berg, Anneke A Maat-Kievit
Abstract
The moral aspects of genetic counselling
are explored in situations where the
outcome of a DNA test does not lead to
certain knowledge. The most frequent
type of interaction between counsellor and
counsellee is when factual information is
given, but sometimes “factual” infor-
mation is diYcult to obtain. How do coun-
sellors deal with “uncertain” knowledge in
genetics? Arguments and assumptions are
presented and the finding of a 27 CAG
repeat in the Huntington gene is used as
an example. However, the questions “how
far does the duty to inform reach?” and
“to what extent is the doctor responsible?”
are important in the whole field of
genetics, and will be even more important
in the future. The aims of science and
clinical practice are discussed; we con-
clude that counsellors run the risk of tak-
ing on an infinite responsibility.
(J Med Genet 2001;38:39–42)
Keywords: ethics; genetics; informed consent; Hunting-
ton’s disease
For several years Huntington’s disease (HD)
(MIM 143100) has served as a paradigm for
presymptomatic testing for hereditary diseases.
Genetic testing for HD by direct analysis of the
size of the CAG repeat has been possible since
1993.1 In contrast to the earlier linkage test,
testing the repeat lengths seemed to allow
definitive diagnoses, enabling a yes or no
answer: allele sizes of>40 CAG repeats lead to
HD, all sizes <40 do not. For a short time all
seemed crystal clear, but a more complex situ-
ation soon emerged. Allele sizes of 36-39 CAG
repeats were sometimes also associated with
HD.However, the HD phenotype is not always
penetrant in subjects with HD alleles in this
size range. There are indeed unaVected sub-
jects aged >70 years with alleles of 36-39 CAG
repeats. Empirical penetrance risks for the HD
phenotype in subjects with these numbers of
CAG repeats are unknown. Accordingly, sub-
jects with these sizes of repeats cannot have
predictive certainty about their HD status from
their test outcome. Furthermore, it appears
that allele sizes sometimes show mutability; an
allele with CAG repeats <36 could indeed
change into an HD allele in the next genera-
tion. For some time the “safe” limit seemed to
be 30 CAG repeats, and the danger range for
mutability 30-35. Then, in 1995, McGlennan
et al2 reported an allele of 27 CAG repeats
which was found in the father of an HD
aVected subject with 38 repeats, indicating the
apparent instability of a CAG repeat of 27.2
This led to a redefinition and after 1995 the
“safe” area was defined as below 27 repeats.
The likelihood of an allele in the 30-35 repeat
range being transmitted as a full HD allele is
unknown. Potential factors include the repeat
size, the sex of the transmitting parent, and
whether it is identified in a (new mutation)
family or in the general population.3 It is even
more unclear how great the risk is in the 27-29
repeat range.
The aim of genetics
The aim of genetics is, like every branch of sci-
ence, to gather “true knowledge”. Geneticists
hope that knowledge about genes and muta-
tions may help to explain causes of diseases and
that understanding the cause can be used to
assist in treatment. Unfortunately, nature often
behaves like Hydra, the many headed monster:
when science cuts a head from this monster,
two other heads appear. Otherwise formulated:
every new solution to an old problem creates
two new problems. In science, “true” is what
“has been proven”, but scientists often have to
live with ambiguous and limited knowledge.
Scientific progress does not only mean “gain-
ing certainty”. In a way, the uncontrollable
field does not become smaller. Geneticists are
also confronted with this paradox. They
attempt to make our world more understand-
able, they want to explain reality and try “to
handle” it. The discovery of the nature of the
Huntington gene mutation with its CAG
repeat mechanism initially created more cer-
tainty, enabling “reliable” presymptomatic
testing. However, the reverse became true also:
the dynamic nature of the mutation brought
more and new uncertainties. For example, we
do not know what a safe margin is in the case of
mutable CAG repeats. We do not know if,
when, how, or why an allele becomes unstable.
Opinions about this subject have changed and
will probably change again in the future, but in
spite of this geneticists want to try to draw “safe
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borders”. The German philosopher Leibniz
had already written in 1703 to his friend
Bernoulli: “Scientists are able to discover
patterns in nature. Those patterns are caused
by occurrences which repeat themselves, but
that repetition is not perfect”.4 This is the rea-
son that these newly discovered patterns create
new uncertainties. How will the repetition be?
Will there be any repetition and when will it
next occur? Or will it be a single event that will
never happen again? Genetics is, like all other
scientific fields, a field of trial and error. This
fact leads in clinical genetics, where counsellors
use scientific discoveries, to questions concern-
ing good clinical practice.
The aim of clinical genetics
Genetic counselling is defined as “a communi-
cation process which deals with the human
problems associated with the occurrence, or
risk of occurrence, of a genetic disorder in a
family”.5 Among other things, this process
involves an attempt to help the person or the
family “to comprehend the medical facts,
including the diagnosis, the probable course of
the disorder and the available management”.5
Providing factual information is a very central
interaction between counsellor and counsellee.
That part of the counselling process is meant to
help a person “choose the course of action
which seems appropriate to him and act in
accordance with that decision”.5 However,
respecting the patient’s autonomy does not
only mean “informing”, but also “sharing
responsibility”. We know it is important that
counsellees get full support from their counsel-
lors in the decision making process. So, respect
also involves “treating persons to enable them
to act autonomously”,6 requiring values such as
empathy and compassion.
In the light of these values, what exactly does
“factual information” mean? Patients have a
right to be informed and the doctor has a cor-
responding duty. But how far does that duty to
inform reach, how far does the doctor’s
responsibility reach, and, most of all, what is in
the best interest of the counsellees? We have to
consider these questions again and again,
because genetics constantly changes and possi-
bilities grow. Genetic technology is less like a
knife, which, in the hands of man, can be used
or abused, but rather more comparable to a car
or a plane: the advantages and the disadvan-
tages go together, they develop simultaneously.
Desired, foreseen, undesired, and unforeseen
consequences go hand in hand.
The duty to inform
Factual information should at least consist of
true statements. A true statement is: “the
absence of HD pathology has not been
documented in any individual with an HD
allele size of >40 CAG repeats who died,
disease free, after living up to or past the
normal life expectancy”.7 This means for those
tested, a yes answer is possible, in contrast to
the group of people with 36-39 CAG repeats.
In that group, a yes or no answer is not
possible, as was shown above. The number of
CAG repeats is a fact, but how this fact has to
be interpreted is sometimes ambiguous. A true
statement is also: “allele sizes of <26 CAG
repeats have never been associated with an HD
phenotype”,7 so a no answer seems possible
too, but in fact these statements are only true
for the time being.What has not been proven is
not necessarily “untrue”. That also goes for the
statement: “allele sizes of <26 CAG repeats
have not been demonstrated to show mutabil-
ity”. Scientists admit that “truth” in this area
has always had a “for the time being” element.
In the Laboratory guidelines for Huntington
disease genetic testing it is stated: “Although no
examples of mutable alleles of this size have
been reported, it has not been shown that allele
sizes of <26 repeats cannot be mutable”.7 To
detect HD appears to be easier than to exclude
it. There is a diVerence between “true for us”
and “really true”.
What does this mean for the golden rule in
clinical genetics that a counsellor must provide
medical information in order to give counsel-
lees the opportunity to choose between alterna-
tives? How should the rule be applied when a
test shows a CAG repeat of 27 or 28? In that
specific situation, what is the relevance of the
factual information? To what extent can or
should a doctor inform? It is obvious that the
theory (30 CAG repeats is a safe limit) has
been falsified, but should the detection of one
mutable 27 CAG repeat change the content of
the information?
Some categories of patients with repeats
between 27 and 30 can be discerned, for exam-
ple, predictive and diagnostic test applicants,
relatives of a newly identified mutation carrier,
test applicants who have inherited 27-30
repeats from the unaVected parent, and
partners of carriers who are tested as controls
because of prenatal diagnosis. Is there a diVer-
ence between the diVerent categories? Should
all or some counsellees be informed about a
repeat length between 27 and 30 and what
should the message be? Is it justified or perhaps
obligatory to always oVer prenatal testing to
exclude the unknown risk of repeat expansion
in the fetus?
The pros and cons
Physicians who feel obliged to inform a person
about a repeat length of less than 30 repeats
give diVerent arguments for doing so. (1) The
risk is small, but it is real. (2) There is
something to oVer, namely prenatal diagnosis.
(3) One must give all the available information
concerning HD. (4) If a person asks for
information about a genetic disease, then
he/she wants information not only about
him/herself but also about his/her oVspring. (5)
When a doctor does not provide this kind of
information, it could be that future parents are
wrongly reassured.
Others formulate arguments against. (1) It is
impossible to inform a couple precisely,
because it is unclear how great the risk is and
no one knows when and why mutability occurs.
(2) Prenatal diagnosis is a “solution” for this
problem one would rather not have. (3) The
repeat size will probably remain stable and not
change at all in the next generations. (4) Cou-
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ples might change and adjust their reproduc-
tive decisions unnecessarily and on the wrong
grounds. (5) When a doctor provides this kind
of information, future parents might suVer
unjustified fear.
It is clear that counsellors face a moral
dilemma. How should a counsellor go about
respecting the patient’s freedom and at the
same time do no harm? Freedom of choice only
means that one is free to choose8 but not
necessarily that one knows what the right
choice is. Both doctors and patients seek argu-
ments to defend their choices. However, most
of the time arguments are used to defend an
already chosen opinion. This is because people
often suppose they know in which direction the
“right” answer must be found. Many doctors
are inclined to give counsellees “all available
information” and defend the decision to
inform about a 27 CAG repeat. They are at
least of the opinion that they should explore the
counsellee’s wish to know such an intermediate
allele test result.3 It is therefore sensible to take
a closer look and consider the assumptions that
lie behind these decisions, decisions which tend
towards doing rather than towards refraining.
In discussions with clinical geneticists of
several departments in The Netherlands the
following assumptions have been put forward.
Assumptions
(1) ONE OUGHT TO AVOID FUTURE REGRET
In general, people regret more what they did
not do or what they have forgotten to do than
what they did, even when it went wrong. Simi-
larly, doctors appear better at providing
arguments justifying a wrong action than when
they omit something. Fear of future regret
directs a counsellor towards informing and a
counsellee towards doing something with the
information because they both experience the
same “anticipated decision regret”.9 However,
the moment a counsellor explores a counsel-
lee’s wish to know a certain test result, the
counsellee’s right not to know is in a way
violated. More precisely, is it necessary to
explore whether there is a wish to be informed
if a CAG repeat of 27 is found in an unaVected
parent or in the partner of a carrier? “Do you
want” questions may lead to supposed wants
and needs, while informing may direct towards
the use of the information rather than to
neglect it. Are counsellors always obliged to
increase the options available and to present
every possible option? What is the aim?
Perhaps the aim lies in the starting point of
genetic counselling.
(2) A COUNSELLOR OUGHT TO PROVIDE FACTUAL
INFORMATION IN A NON-DIRECTIVE WAY
Sometimes, strictly adhering to the admonition
to be morally neutral in the selection and
transmission of information leads counsellors
simply to dump information onto their clients,
as stated by Caplan.10 But is “informing about
the facts” in order “to choose and act” an exer-
cise in truth dumping in which every fact, every
option, every risk, and every benefit is un-
leashed? Is it really possible to be non-directive
and inform about every possible event? Non-
directive is not the same as morally neutral.
Informing is not as value free as it sometimes
seems to be, certainly not for the one who
receives the information. Information from a
doctor has a prescribing element. If a genetic
counsellor thinks he/she ought to inform a
couple of all findings, even if the findings are
uninformative or diYcult to interpret, he/she
creates an environment in which the decision
“to do” something with the test results seems
wiser than “to do nothing”.
(3) COUNSELLORS OUGHT TO TELL THE TRUTH
AND RESPECT THE AUTONOMY OF THE
COUNSELLEE
It seems a universal rule to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in order
to give the patient the opportunity to act freely.
But when it is unclear what “the truth” is, this
rule can easily lead to a sort of technical
imperative. Not an imperative in the sense of
“we have got the technology so we ought to use
it” but in the sense of “we have used the tech-
nology so we ought to inform about all the
results in every possible detail”. However,
informing a counsellee does not always pro-
mote his autonomy, because autonomy is
impossible in cases of inadequate and incom-
plete understanding.
(4) ONE OUGHT TO AVOID A LEGAL CLAIM
Fearing legal claims will probably direct the
counsellor’s choices too. Our medicine seems
to become more and more “defensive”. Glo-
balisation of our world has greatly speeded up
transfer of knowledge. Nowadays, scientists
strive to use “the best method in the world” to
solve a given problem. There is a continuous
exchange of knowledge and, as a result, also of
moral rules and values. However, moral ideas
and ideals are not universal and depend,
among other things, on law, insurances,
economic factors, public policy, etc. Exchang-
ing opinions, arguments, reasons, and motives
remains important, but we must avoid the
possibility of legal claims in one country
directing the decisions and actions in another.
In the contact between counsellor and counsel-
lee moral values are often more important than
legislation. We must prevent legal rules from
harming those who are supposed to be
protected by those rules.
Conclusion
Of course, respecting the counsellees’ au-
tonomy means informing them of the medical
facts, in order to give them the opportunity to
choose between alternatives. However, to
repeat our questions: what are the relevant
medical facts and, most of all, to what extent
should the doctor be responsible? Sometimes it
seems “chance” no longer exists nowadays, it
seems “fate” has completely changed to “fact”.
The danger that one, as a counsellor, risks is to
feel infinitely responsible, not because one has
caused something, but because one did not try
to avoid it. If we feel responsible for all the
facts, we want to deal, one way or another, with
those facts. However, we have to realise that
our capacities are limited, particularly the
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capacity to understand and foresee all the con-
sequences of our actions. We should not take
more responsibility than we are able to bear.
As long as we do not know what the right
decision is, we have to proceed carefully.
Thousands of years ago the Greek physician
Gorgias stated: “man can not know the past
entirely, he can not overlook the present
entirely and he can not foresee the future”.
Nowadays everything seems to be calculable
and predictable, but destiny is still capricious
and life is still precarious. Counsellors want to
tell the truth but unfortunately they do not
always know what the truth is, as illustrated by
the mutability of CAG repeats. They do not
know how great the chance is that the repeats
will expand. If counsellors do not know how to
interpret certain facts, they are not able to give
their counsellees the right interpretation either.
The field of genetics becomes more and more a
field of risk estimates and therefore the
question will becomemore how “certain” a risk
percentage is, and most of all which uncertain
percentage is worth mentioning. In “minimal
risk” situations (in this example when unaf-
fected parents or partners are involved) it is
wise for the counsellor to refrain, to keep his
uncertainty to himself, to tell his patients the
things he is pretty much sure of, and to keep
silent about the things in which “chance” and
“luck” play an important role. This is because
the advantages for the counsellee are limited in
those kinds of situations. If a counsellor has
doubts about the value of ambiguous knowl-
edge, the solution cannot be left to the respon-
sibility of the counsellee. The question is if it is
always justified to give “all available” infor-
mation to counsellees, presuming that “know-
ing” is always better than “not-knowing”, and
on the assumption that counsellees are able to
cope with and master all kinds of uncertainties.
This point of view does not only have conse-
quences for counsellors, but also for counsel-
lees and, ultimately, for the whole of society.
Do the latter accept and respect the limitation
of the doctor’s responsibility and accept the
limitations of technology? Resources should be
invested into researching the wants, needs, and
expectations of (potential) counsellees. Do
they want information about every single
hypothesis and every single exception? What
do they really want and expect from genetics
and what are counsellors able and willing to
give?
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